About a decade before Xerxes campaign in
Greece, his father Darius failed to take control of its territory and citizens.
Darius was unable to conquer the opposing Greek force during his campaign, and
turned back to Persia. He died before he could return to finish what he had
started and left Xerxes as the Persian king. Xerxes had prepared his military
to march on Greece, with the sole purpose of placing all of Greece under his
rule.
News of the Persian forces gathering
reached Greece in the spring of 480 B.C.E. According to Plutarch, Xerxes began
by sending messengers to the major Greek poleis demanding subjugation.[1] Sparta
acknowledged the threat of war and consulted the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi.
According to Herodotus they were informed, “that either Sparta or a Spartan
king must perish.”[2] More
specifically the oracle stated that the king had to be a descendant of
Hercules; Leonidas was apparently that king.
In Sparta the ephors deliberated
about the events that had taken place. Leonidas was eventually granted
permission to march with his personal bodyguards. Herodotus states,
“afterwards, however, when they had kept the festival,…they intended then to
leave a garrison in Sparta and come to help in full force with speed…”[3] The reason
that the main force remained was, because of the upcoming Spartan holiday,
Carnea, dedicated to the Greek god Apollo. In August 480 B.C.E., Leonidas left
Sparta along with his three hundred hoplite bodyguards and their helots, or
slaves. They marched for Thermopylae and hoped that they would be joined by
their other Greek allies.[4]
Thermopylae means “hot gates” in the
Greek language and was named for the hot springs located nearby. The gates, or
passage, was also referred to as an entrance to Hell, or Hades. Thermopylae is
one of the easily accessible passages between the Malian Gulf and the northern
part of the Attica peninsula. A journal article in the Journal of Field
Archaeology claims, “The Spartan leader, Leonidas, may have chosen the
middle gate for his defense position based on the vicinity of the low hill,
Kolonos, and wall supposedly built by the Phocians [sic].”[5] This middle
gate is located between the Anopaea Mountains and the Malian Gulf. The location
was a smart choice for Leonidas and the Greek troops to make their stand,
because of its easily defendable area.
At Thermopylae the Spartan’s hopes
were granted. Several other small allied forces joined them, all of which were
also cavalry. Herodotus gave an estimate of the allied troops:
Of
the Spartans three hundred hoplites; of the men of Tegea and Mantineia a
thousand, half from each place, from Orchomenos in Arcadia a hundred and
twenty, and from the rest of Arcadia a thousand,--of the Arcadians so many;
from Corinth four hundred, from Phlius two hundred, and of the men of Mykene
eighty: these were they who came from the Peloponnese; and from the Baotians
[sic] seven hundred of the Thespians, and of the Thebans four hundred.[6]

Phocians were chosen due to their familiarity with the surrounding land. Leonidas knew that, in the event the path was discovered, it would be an easy way for the troops to sneak up and surround them. After the Persians arrived in mid August, the Greek allies waited patiently for the Persians to make their move. Xerxes sent a scout to spy on the Greeks and returned with a shocking report. Paul Cartledge states that, “Xerxes had laughed, refusing to believe that men who [combed] their [long hair] before fighting would make serious opponents in the field.”
After their
arrival, the Persians had situated themselves north of Thermopylae off the coast of the Malian Gulf. A journal
article in the Journal
of Field Archaeology by John C. Kraft observes that, “The hill west of [the
city of] Anthela is the only place from which the battle could be watched by a
Persian king who presumably required a large number of troops to protect him.”[9] The Persian
force is estimated between 130,000 to a million or more of mostly cavalry.
Among them were approximately 10,000 infantry, called the Immortals. According
to J.A.R. Munro, Herodotus claimed that there were infantry, cavalry, and
”camel and chariot corps.”[10]
Xerxes sent an envoy to the Leonidas demanding that they surrender to him, but
Leonidas refused.
Xerxes waited four days expecting
that the Greek army would retreat, but they did not. On the fifth day after
arrival, Xerxes sent the Medes and Cissians to attack. The Spartans were armed
in their traditional Lycurgan armor with a large bronze shields, long spears,
and short swords.[11]
They formed the phalanx position outside the wall built around the middle gate
at Thermopylae. It was built years before for the defense of the Phocians
against the Thessalians during war. As the Greeks fought, the seemingly
nondiminishing Persian force, the reserve ranks took the place of those
fighting so that none would grow too tired. Xenophon suggests that:
One section of a company is of course
stepping up behind another from the rear. Now, if at such a moment a hostile
force appears in the front in battle order, the word is passed down to the
commander of each section….And so throughout the whole length of the column,
until the line is formed facing the enemy…Each file performs a counter march
with the effect of bringing the best men face to face with the enemy all along
the line.[12]
The Greek phalanx held up against
the hordes of Persian arrows. Leonidas had been informed that the Persian
arrows would darken the sky, but they were useless in the close quarters of the
opposing forces.[13]
Their short spears were also unable to reach past the shields and long spears
of the Greek force. The Persians light armor and shields made of wicker was
little protection against the Greek weapons. The Persian force was unprepared
and unequal for the phalanx tactics. In an attempt to cut down more
enemies, the Greeks faked retreat to bring the Persians in closer, only to turn
and attack. Xerxes eventually withdrew the remaining troops and sent in the
Immortals. Munro explains, “It was his obvious strategy to use his
superior numbers to turn the Greek positions.”[14]
The Immortals faced the same problem as the Medes and Cissians in the close
contact fighting with the Greeks, and Xerxes withdrew them also.
On the second day Xerxes sent in his
force against the Greeks again. It proved to only be a repeat of the day
before. Paul Cartledge states, “Xerxes found out all too painfully what they
[the Spartans] were made of: a fighting machine strong enough, skillful enough
and sufficiently iron-willed to repel his hordes from the attempt to
incorporate the mainland Greeks in his oriental empire…”[15]
Xerxes became desperate to end the battle, especially due to the lack of
supplies for his troops and the risk of starvation. His navy fleet had been
destroyed after a storm in the Malian Gulf. To Xerxes surprise he was given the
advantage when a Greek traitor, named Ephialtes, came to him with news of a
hidden path through the mountains. This was the same pass which Leonidas had
sent the Phocians to garrison.
During the night, Xerxes sent his
commander Hydarnes and his
Immortals with Ephialtes along the path. W. Kendrick Pritchett suggests,
“Ephialtes with the Persians ‘having crossed the Asopos river went southward up
the Chalkomata road to a position near modern Eleutherochori where he turned
eastward along the ridge of the mountain to Nevropolis.”[16]
The Immortals let loose their arrows at the Phocians guarding the path and they
retreated. Pritchett then suggests that, “the Persians continued to Old
Drakospilia, then down the Alpenos ridge to the Black-Buttock....This was a
route by which an army of 10,000 men could have proceeded.”[17]
As the Persians made their way towards the Greek force Leonidas was informed of
their activity.
Leonidas called his troops together to discuss
their next move. The entire Greek force wanted to remain at Thermopylae.
Leonidas remembered the prophecy from the Oracle at Delphi and refused to
leave; if the Spartans retreated they would be considered cowards. Instead,
Leonidas sent away most of the garrison; possibly so they could fortify another
location if the Persians defeated them, or to simply save their lives, because
death was inevitable.[18]
Other theories suggest that
the Spartans may have been abandoned by their allies, out of fear.[19]
Leonidas, his remaining bodyguards, their helots, the Thebans, and Thespians remained to face the
Persians.
At
first light on the third day of battle Xerxes sent his remaining force against
the Greeks. At this same time the Immortals emerged from the hidden path, behind
them. Leonidas and the Greeks knew they were going to die and instead of
forming their original position at the wall came out to meet the Persian force.
Herodotus states, “for
knowing the death which was about to come upon them by reason of those who were
going round the mountain, they displayed upon the Barbarians all the
strength which they had, to its greatest extent, disregarding danger and acting
as if possessed by a spirit of recklessness. “ [20]
The Thebans were
separated from the group and forced to surrender. All of the other remaining
Greeks at Thermopylae were slaughtered; and Leonidas like many of the Greeks
had died from numerous arrow wounds.
The
Persians honored their dead enemies in the typical response; and the dead were
eventually buried were they fell.[21]
With Xerxes’ rage over the loss of his men against such a small opposing force,
he ordered Leonidas’ body to be desecrated. Leonidas was beheaded and his was
body hung to a cross.[22]
Later Leonidas was buried with his troops. Herodotus relays an epitaph, “Stranger, report this word, we pray, to
the Spartans, that lying here [sic] in this spot we remain, faithfully keeping
their laws.” [23]
The epitaph, or writing
honoring the dead, was created by Simonides and placed over the graves on the
hill in Kolonos.
Due
to Leonidas’ leadership, the Persians were delayed in their mission to attack
Athens. Xerxes numbers had been severely depleted. He had also lost many ships
the storm in the Malian Gulf. These factors delayed Xerxes from marching
on Athens giving them enough time to prepare for invasion. Despite Xerxes
efforts to dampen the Greek morale and bring them under his rule, the Spartans
provided the opposite effect. Paul Cartledge claims, “had it not been for the
Spartans’ suicidal but heroic stand at Thermopylae, which showed that the
Persians could be resisted, it is unlikely that the small, wavering and
uncohesive force of loyalist Greeks would have had the nerve to imagine that
they might one day win.”[24]
This time granted by the Spartans to the Athenians, aided in the eventual
Persian naval defeated at Salamis.
At the same time the battle at Thermopylae had taken place, the Persian
navy battled the Greek navy. The Battle of Artemisium took place off the
northern coast of Euboea. Munro states that, “It is universally
recognized that Thermopylae could not have been help without Artemisium for it
would have been at once turned by the enemy’s fleet.”[25]
If it is suggested that the events of Thermopylae helped to create the
outcome of the events at Salamis, then the events at Artemisium played a part
in the outcome of Salamis as well.
Leonidas
led the Greek troops against Persia with precise military expertise against all
odds. Their strategy and chosen location aided in their three day stand at the
“hot gates.” The events which took place in August 480 B.C.E. may not have made
a large impact on the outcome at Salamis, but the legend has resounded
throughout time. King Leonidas and the Spartans became heroes to the Greeks in
a time when morale was low, which proved to be enough for the Greeks at Salamis
to crush the Persian force and send them running home.
ENDNOTES
ENDNOTES
[1] Plutarch (46-120 AD), Plutarch’s Life of
Themistocles, Ancient/Classical History, accessed October 17, 2012.
http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_text_plutarch_themistocles.htm
[2] Arthur Fairbanks, “Herodotus and the
Oracle at Delphi,” The
Classical Journal 1, no. 2 (1906): 42. JSTOR.
[3] Herodotus (484-425 BC), Herodotus, The
Histories: Vol. 2 of 2, trans. G. C. Macaulay (Charleston: Forgotten Books,
2007), 340.
[5] John C. Kraft et al., “The Pass at
Thermopylae, Greece,” Journal of Field
Archaeology 14, no. 2 (1987): 195. JSTOR.
[10] J.A. R. Munro, “Some Observations on the
Persian Wars (Continued),” The Journal of
Hellenic Studies, no. 22 (1902): 295. JSTOR.
[11] Xenophon (430-354 BC), The Polity of the
Lacedaemonians, Ancient/Classical History, accessed October 1, 2012.
http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_text_xenophon_lacedaemonians.htm
[16] W. Kendrick Pritchett, “New Light on
Thermopylai,” American
Journal of Archaeology 62, no. 2 (1958): 211. JSTOR.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cartledge, Paul. “To Die For?” History Today 52, no. 8 (2002): 20-25. ProQuest.
Fairbanks, Arthur. “Herodotus and the Oracle at Delphi.” The Classical Journal1, No. 2 (1906): 37-48. JSTOR.
Herodotus (484-425 BC). Herodotus, The Histories: Vol. 2 of 2. Translated by G. C. Macaulay. Charleston: Forgotten Books, 2007.
Kraft, John C., George Rapp, Jr., George J. Szemier, Christos Tziavos, and Edward W. Kase. “The Pass at Thermopylae Greece.” Journal of Field Archaeology 14, no. 2 (1987): 181-198. JSTOR.
Munro, J.A.R. “Some Observations on the Persian Wars (Continued).” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, no. 22 (1902): 294-332. JSTOR.
Plutarch (46-120 AD). Plutarch’s Life of Themistocles, Ancient/Classical History, Accessed October 17, 2012. http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_text_plutarch_themistocles.htm
Pritchett, W. Kendrick. “New Light on Thermopylai.” American Journal of Archaeology 62, no. 2 (1958): 203-213. JSTOR.
Xenophon (430-354 BC). The Polity of the Lacedaemonians. Ancient/Classical History. Accessed October 1, 2012. http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_text_xenophon_lacedaemonians.htm
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